• United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
  • 04-16-00022-CV
At issue in this appeal was whether the deed restrictions for appellee, which provided that homes should be "used solely for residential purposes," prevented homeowner appellant from leasing his home for short periods of time to individuals who have no intent to remain in the home. The court concluded that the deed restrictions did prevent such activity; therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. Noting that the language of the restrictive covenant was unambiguous, the court applied §202.003 of the Texas Property Code, explaining that in construing the intent of the framers of the restrictive covenant, it would "liberally construe the covenant's language and ensure that every provision is given effect." The court explained that although the term "residence" is given a variety of meaning, residence generally requires both physical presence and an intention to remain. Additionally, the court emphasized that the "Texas Property Code draws a distinction between a permanent residence and transient housing, which includes rooms at hotels, motels, inns and the like." Munson v. Miilton, 948 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1997) However, because the trial court's judgment granted appellee injunctive relief in the absence of pleading for such relief, the court modified those parts of the judgment that granted appellee injunctive relief and affirmed the judgment as modified. Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Association Inc., San Antonio Court of Appeals, Case No.: 04-16-00022-CV, 11/16/2016

This premium content is reserved for Texas Lawyer subscribers.

Continue reading by getting started with a subscription.

Already a subscriber? Log in now